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CASE NOTES
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

-

FEDERAL INVESTIGATORY POWER OVER

BI-STATE AGENCY THROUGH RESERVATION TO CONGRESS UNDER
COMPACT CLAUSE OF CONSTITUTION.

Tobin v. United States, (D.C. Cir. 1962)
Appellant was the Executive Director of the Port of New York
Authority (Port Authority), a corporate body created in 1921 by compact between the states of New York and New Jersey. He had been requested to appear before a Subcommittee of the House of Representatives
which was conducting an investigation for the purpose of amending or
repealing the consent given by Congress to the aforementioned compact
pursuant to Article I, § 10 of the United States Constitution. Appellant had voluntarily furnished the Subcommittee with many of the Port
Authority's records but had objected to the production of internal file
material, including subordinate staff reports, day-to-day working papers,
and other similar memoranda. The Director's refusal to comply with a
subpoena calling for virtually all of the Port Authority's records resulted
in his conviction in a federal district court for Congressional contempt.
The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia reversed,
holding that the Subcommittee's probe was unauthorized since Congress
had not meant to delegate to it the power to conduct such an extensive
investigation. Tobin v. United States, 306 F.2d 270 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
In reaching its conclusion, the circuit court, adhering to the wellestablished rule of avoiding constitutional issues when possible, by-passed
the important point raised by the appellant concerning the constitutionality
of conditioning Congressional consent to the formation of interstate compacts by reserving to itself the power to alter, amend, or repeal such consent. Nevertheless, because of the possible importance of this question in
future litigation, this note shall consider the constitutionality of such a
reservation.
Article 1, § 10, of the United States Constitution provides: "No
State shall, without the Consent of Congress, . . . enter into any Agreement

or Compact with another State ..."I
1. U.S. CONS'r. ART. 1, § 10: "No State shall, without the Consent of Congress,
lay any Duty of Tonnage, keep Troops, or Ships of War in time of Peace, enter

into any Agreement or Compact with another State, or with a foreign Power, or
engage in War unless actually invaded or in such imminent Danger as will not
admit of delay."

(237)
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It must be conceded that since a compact may involve the interests
of states other than the actual parties immediately involved, Congress must
exercise national supervision through its power to grant or withhold consent, or by granting it only after appropriate conditions have been fulfilled.2
However, it does not necessarily follow that Congress, having granted consent, may effectually reserve the right to amend or to repeal. There has been
little judicial comment on this topic. Research reveals no instance where
Congress has ever amended or repealed its consent once given.
"Where government consent is essential, the consent may be granted
upon terms appropriate to the subject and transgressing no constitutional
limitation. ''1 It would seem that the reservation of the right to alter, amend,
or repeal, allows future federal governing power which would tend to circumscribe state jurisdiction regarding matters whose control rests exclusively within the power of the state. The states do not derive the power
to enter into compacts with other states from the compact clause. This
power is inherent in the very notion of sovereignty and is reserved to the
states by the Tenth Amendment. Mr. Justice Brandeis recognized this
principle when, in Hinderlider v. La Plata River Co.,4 he stated that the
compact clause incorporated to our nation the ancient treaty making power
of independent sovereign nations which was practiced by the states long
before the Constitution was adopted.
The compact power has not been surrendered under the Constitution
but is expressly recognized by it although guarded in its exercise by a
single limitation - the consent of Congress.5 Unless and until this condition precedent is met a compact remains invalid. But when Congressional
consent is given the lone impediment is removed and the states are able
to exercise their sovereign power. 6 Just as the consent of Congress does
not cause the compact to come into existence neither does it endue the
compact with any federal power or jurisdiction. Rather, it is from the states
that the endowments of character, power, and jurisdiction derive. The
compact becomes an agency of the state. "This Union was and is a union
of states, equal in power, dignity, and authority, each competent to exert
that residum of sovereignty not delegated to the United States by the
Constitution itself." 7 If a right to amend, alter, or repeal is permitted it
would appear that the necessity of Congressional consent had somehow
federalized the compact and deprived the state of the freedom from federal
interference which it would have had had it performed essentially the same
functions on its own. The compact clause has for its purpose the maintenance of ordinary and otherwise lawful federal jurisdiction while, at the
same time preserving the traditional function of the states to handle local
2. Frankfurter and Landis, The Compact Clause of the Constitution-A Study
in Interstate Adjustments, 34 YALE L.J. 685, 695 (1925).
3. James v. Dravo Construction Co., 302 U.S. 134, 148, 58 S. Ct. 208, 215 (1937).
4. 304 U.S. 92, 104, 58 S.Ct. 803, 808 (1938).
5. Poole v. Fleeger, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 182, 207 (1837).
6. Rhode Island v. Massachusetts, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 1233, 1261 (1838).
7. Coyle v. Smith, 221 U.S. 559, 31 5.Ct. 688, 690 (1910).
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difficulties. The present reservation would violate this goal by permitting
the federal government to usurp a local administrative position totally outside the domain of legitimate federal interest. The net result would be that
the state would be deprived of the management and control of the important
domestic functions of its own agency. Although Congress may legitimately
prefix its consent upon the performance of "appropriate" conditions, these
do not include conditions by which Congress may acquire powers not conferred upon it by the Constitution. The vital condition precedent to the
validity of any condition attached to Congressional consent is that it be
constitutional. No power to amend, alter, or repeal appears expressly in
the compact clause. "The power to impose conditions is not a lesser part
of the greater power to withhold, but instead a distinct exercise of power
which must find its own justification." If the power was not conferred as
a corollary to the consent function the fact that Congress reserved such
power when giving its consent does not fill the void of constitutional omission - especially such purposeful omission. 9 If such a restriction of a
state's reserved power is to be sanctioned merely because of a strained
implication arising from the power to give consent, it is difficult to see
where the line will be drawn against restriction imposed upon the state.
If one constitutional right of a state be yielded as a condition to receiving
Congressional consent what is there that will prevent Congress from seeking the surrender of all a state's reserved rights? Fundamental constitutional guaranties should not be disposed of so easily.
In contrast, consider the type of condition that allows future governing
acts which tend to circumscribe state power regarding matters whose control rests exclusively within the scope of conceded Congressional power.
Good examples of proper Congressional action to foster legitimate federal
interests are two of the reservations included by Congress in the compact
creating the Port of New York Authority. The first reads that no "right or
jurisdiction of the United States in and over" the areas within the port
district is impaired.' 0 Here Congress did not declare any right that obtruded into purely local governmental problems. "It was merely a caveat
to obviate a claim that Congress was consenting to the creation of an
enclave in which the normal 'right or jurisdiction of the United States'
might be deemed to have been lost."" The second was an affirmance of
the then existing statutory requirement for approval by the Chief of Engineers and the Secretaiy of War for the construction of certain bridges and
tunnels and for changes regarding navigable waters.12 This was a valid
8. Note, Unconstitutional Conditions, 73 HARV. L. Rnv. 1595, 1609 (1960).
9. Article 1, § 10, exemplifies the Framers' ability to devise language capable of
linking a consent function with a continuing power of revision and control: "No
State shall, without the Consent of the Congress, lay any Imposts or Duties on
Imports or Exports, . . . and all such Laws shall be subject to the Revision and
Controul of the Congress." Compare with language of article 1, § 10 which is
cited in supra note 1.
10. 42 Stat. 822, 826 (1922).
11. Brief for Defendant, p. 89.
12. 42 Stat. 822, 826 (1922).

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1963

3

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 8, Iss. 2 [1963], Art. 5
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 8

condition imposed to belie any suspicion that the Port of New York
Authority was to be in any way privileged as regarding federal regulation
applicable to other agencies engaging in similar pursuits.
This is not to say that the federal government is without power to
exercise a check over any of the Port Authority's actions. Therefore,
although the presence of a reservation does not create an extraordinary
Congressional power, the absence of reservation does not avoid an ordinary
regulatory power which Congress would otherwise have. The Constitution
gives to Congress certain plenary powers. Until Congress exercises these
powers the states may generally proceed to regulate and control the subject
to which they would apply. But, a careful distinction must be made between
the ways in which Congressional control over an operational interstate
compact may be constitutionally exercised. We find merit in Mr. Tobin's
contention that "control undertaken pursuant to the plenary power is licit,
whereas control attempted in the sense of withdrawing consent under the
compact clause is illicit." 1 The condition upon which consent is given
cannot be more than a technique for protecting existing federal interests. It
cannot create a new and unknown federal right which would otherwise be
wholly beyond the scope of legitimate federal concern.
The large number 4 and great variety 15 of interstate compacts in effect
today evidence the confidence of the states in an irrevocable consent upon
which to anchor interstate covenants of long duration and far reaching
effect. Great tragedy would ensue were it to be decided the founding
fathers meant to prescribe an evanescent consent. States would be hesitant
to enter into a compact where the agreement could be obliterated by a
decree of the federal government. States would be reckless to attempt
solution of regional problems by use of compacts instead of individual
state action when use of the former method would amount to relinquishment
of the state's freedom of action and subjection to federal supervision and
control, while the latter device would permit unimpeded independent
sovereign action.
It must be concluded that both from a constitutional and practical
point of view it would be unwise to allow Congress to reserve the power
to alter interstate compacts.' 8
13. Tobin v. United States, 306 F.2d 270, 274 (D.C. Cir. 1962).

14. More than 170 compacts have been formed since the Constitution was adopted.
15. Compacts have been used in the following fields: "Development of terminal
and transportation facilities, maintenance of an interstate park, forest fire protection,
water supply, control of water pollution, marine fisheries conservation, aspects of
higher education-this is but a random list of present activities." 1955 INTFRGOVERNMZNTAL RZLATIONS COMMISSIONs REp. 46.
16. See S. RAP. No. 1367, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 2, 18, 19 (1958), which related
to H.R. 7153 providing for the consent of Congress to a boundary compact between
Oregon and Washington. The Report recommended deletion of a provision reserving
the right to alter, amend, or repeal the consent because of the conclusion of the
Senate Judiciary Committee and the Department of Justice that such a reservation
was beyond the power of Congress. The Senate deleted the amend or repeal reservation from H.R. 7153 and the bill went to the Conference Committee in which the
Managers on the Part of the House were headed by Chairman Celler. The Conference
Report reinstated the reservation but carefully stated the basis on which it did so:
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But even assuming that Congress, through the compact clause, does
have the right to amend or repeal the charter of the Port of New York
Authority, it still remains to be answered whether Congress has the right
to compel the present witness to produce the documents in question. It
should be noted that certain records were willingly given at the request of
the Subcommittee. The objection was to the production of internal file
material, such as subordinate staff reports and inter-office memoranda.
In general, the power of Congress to investigate is inherent in its
legislative powers.1 7 In order to legislate effectively and prudently the
legislature must be adequately informed.' 8 However, the power of investigation is limited both in itself and in its operation. The investigation must
have a valid legislative purpose 19 and every question asked must be pertinent to that purpose.20 Even so, where the right to investigate conflicts
21
with the fundamental rights of another, there must be a reconciliation.
22
In United States v. Rumley, the United States Supreme Court, in reaffirming the Congressional right to conduct investigations, quoted Mr.
23
Justice Holmes' statement in Hudson County Water Co. v. McCarter:
All rights tend to declare themselves absolute to their logical extreme.
Yet all in fact are limited by the neighborhood of principles of policy
which are other than those on which the particular right is founded,
and which become
strong enough to hold their own where a certain
24
point is reached.
if the Senate's legal position were correct, the reservation would be of no effect and,
therefore, harmless; whereas, if the Senate were not correct, it would be wiser to
leave the provision in since Congress has been doing so for 47 years. It was reasoned
that omitting it from the legislation might give rise to the inference that Congress
was foreclosing itself from amending the act at some later date. Conference Report,
Statement of the Managers on the Part of the House, H.R. Rtp. No. 2234, 85th
Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1958).
17. Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, 77 S. Ct. 1173 (1957) ; Kilbourn v.
Thompson, 103 U.S. 168 (1881) ; McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135, 47 S. Ct.
319 (1927).
18. United States v. Rumley, 345 U.S. 41, 73 S. Ct. 543 (1953).
19. Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 79 S. Ct. 1081 (1959), in reiterating
the time honored doctrines of investigations, declared that " . . . Congress may only
investigate into those areas in which it may potentially legislate or appropriate."
20. In Braden v. United States, 365 U.S. 431, 81 S. Ct. 584 (1961), the court
said that facts requested must be pertinent to the question under inquiry, and the investigating committee must have reasonable grounds for believing them to be pertinent.
21. The idea of striking a compromise between conflicting rights is not new. As
stated by the lower court in this case:
. . . in analogous situations where a conflict has been presented between asserted
rights and privileges, often having Constitutional origins, courts have attempted
to resolve the problem by balancing the interests in the particular. This has
been so, for example, where First Amendments rights have conflicted with the
Congressional investigatory power; where a criminal defendant's right to prepare
his defense has clashed with the Government's interest in protecting the flow of
information from informants; where a state's interest in maintaining an important
activity has conflicted with the Federal power to tax; and, significantly, where
the interest of a defendant in a civil contempt case in preparing a full defense
has conflicted with a Federal agency's asserted executive privilege for "internal"
documents. United States v. Tobin, 195 F. Supp. 588, 610 (D.D.C. 1961).
See also Mr. Justice Harlan's opening remarks in Barenblatt v. United States,
supra note 19.
22. 345 U.S. 41, 73 S. Ct. 543 (1953).
23. 209 U.S. 349, 28 S. Ct. 529 (1908).
24. Supra note 22 at 43, 73 S. Ct. at 545 (1953).
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The few decisions of the United States Supreme Court which deal
with the conflict of the Congressional right to investigate with other safe
guarded rights chiefly are concerned with the right to protection against
self incrimination and the due process requirement that the questions asked
by Congress be pertinent to the subject matter of the investigation. 25 The
present case involves the right of state sovereignty. The question of to
what extent the sovereign right of a state to operate its agencies without
interference limits the Congressional right to investigation seems to resolve
itself into the more basic issue of how much power was granted to Congress
under the compact clause. Since Congress can only request documents
which are pertinent to a subject about which it can legislate, it must first be
decided whether the request for the documents in question was pertinent
to the right to repeal or amend consent before there can be any need for
a balancing of interests. For the documents in question to be pertinent it
would have to be assumed that the power of Congress to repeal its consent
implies a right of Congress to examine any document used by the Authority.
Pertinency is given a very broad interpretation by the courts. 26 It does
not seem that it would be unreasonable to allow as extensive an investigation as was attempted in the present case if Congress has the power to
repeal. its consent. The right to withdraw its consent seems to imply a
right to have the compact operated in a manner substantially in accord with
the desires of Congress. At this point, there would arise the need for a
balancing of interests.
A further consideration relates to whether Congress has the right to
withdraw its consent to a compact in pursuance of one of its plenary
powers. In this case, the impact of the Port of New York Authority on
interstate commerce is obvious,

27

and it cannot be doubted that the Author-

ity would be bound by any restrictions placed on its operations by Congress
in pursuance of that power. If Congress were to require the Authority to
collect an excise tax on certain goods, the Authority would be obligated to
abide by that regulation. An early United States Supreme Court decision
held that the exercise of the right to regulate interstate commerce is not
limited by the operation of the compact clause.28 In that case, a Congres25. Braden v. United States, supra note 20.
26. "A legislative inquiry may be as broad, as searching, and as exhaustive as
is necessary to make effective the constitutional powers of Congress ....
A judicial
inquiry relates to a case, and the evidence to be admissible must be measured by the
narrow limits of the pleadings. A legislative inquiry anticipates all possible cases
which may arise thereunder and the evidence to be admissible must be responsive to
the scope of the inquiry which generally is very broad." (Emphasis supplied.) Townsend v. United States, 95 F.2d 352, 361 (D.C. Cir. 1938).
"... pertinency in this context is necessarily broader than relevancy in the law
of evidence." United States v. Orman, 207 F.2d 148, 153 (3d Cir. 1953).
27. The floor discussions at the time of the adoption of the compact included a
statement by the resolutions' sponsor that "the port of New York is an asset of the
entire nation ... , the people of New York and New Jersey owe it to themselves
and to the country to properly develop it." 195 F. Supp. 588, 605 (D.D.C. 1961).
28. Pennsylvania v. Wheeling and Belmont Bridge Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.)
435 (1856). Pennsylvania sued to enjoin the defendants from constructing a bridge
over the Ohio River. The compact between Virginia and Kentucky attempted to
establish perpetual freedom of navigation of that river. Congress passed a law which 6
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